The Cortes Generales in the economic regulation era

Abstract

The advent of the Regulatory State as a result of the evolution of the Social State after the processes of economic liberalization has transformed the techniques of State intervention in the economy. The so-called “economic regulation” supposes a paradigm shift with consequences on the role of Parliament. The progressive preeminence of the Executive, already begun with its previous role as provider of goods and services in the market, intensifies, and now the regulatory authorities come also into play. Independent administrations characterized by their technical specialization, but which pose constitutionality doubts due to their connotation as independent and their concentration of diverse attributions. The presence of regulatory agencies will represent an institutional challenge for the Cortes Generales, in a context in which the sources of law system has been altered by the appearance of new agents with regulatory powers and where their ability to define the general interest has been derived to these new subjects, guided by economic efficiency in their decision-making process. In the face of such an uncertain scenario, the purpose of this reflection is to claim the return to centrality of the Cortes Generales as the best guarantee of the democratic legitimacy of economic intervention policies. Without denying the potentialities of the agency model in terms of expertise, a series of proposals can be formulated for the future aimed at recovering that centrality by reconsidering agencies configuration, trying to save them from criticism of its democratic deficit.